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ASSESSING CHINA'S 1994 FISCAL REFORMS:
AN INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mengzhong Zhang*

ABSTRACT. To boost the fiscal revenue, i.e., government revenue over GOP
and central government revenue over government total revenue, China
conducted the 1994 fiscal reforms. According to some observers, the results
of the initial reforms were mixed. This study reveals, contrary to most
examinations of previous studies, the 1994 fiscal reforms have been an
enormous success in achieving the original policy purposes, although
remaining problems still present a daunting task for the Chinese government.
This paper examines the factors triggering the 1994 fiscal reforms, reveals
the contents and accomplishments of the reforms, explores unfinished tasks
and ultimately proposes some policy implications.
INTRODUCTION
By any standards, China's 1994 fiscal reform is not a whimsical
action triggered by impractical theory or policy considerations. Rather,
the reform was derived from a converging force that came from a
Looking at the issue from a general
number of directions.
perspective, the reform was an adjustment of the relationships
between central and local governments, between government and
enterprises, and between the state and citizens. This effort was an
ongoing process along the line of the grand policy "Reform and
Opening to the Outside" stipulated in the Third Plenum of the
Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. The primary purpose
of the 1994 fiscal reform was to increase the ratio of government
revenue over GOP and the ratio of central government revenue over
total government revenue. In short, the 1994 fiscal reform targeted at
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strengthening the capacity of central government in its macro
economic management and coordination.
The initial responses of China's 1994 fiscal reforms were indeed
mixed, at best. Most Chinese scholars and practitioners alike kept a
cautiously optimistic stance about the fiscal reform design, arguing it
was a rational approach targeted at solving a number of policy
concerns. Looking at the outcomes of the reforms, however, these
scholars and practitioners might feel dismayed since the reforms
failed to bring about the expected results. Some local Chinese
officials complained that the reforms were a selfish action or a trick
played by the central government, putting the local government at an
even more difficult fiscal plight.3 Western scholars in Chinese studies
presented a balanced view of the reforms on the surface, but a sense
of suspicion exists regarding whether the reform could generate the
anticipated outcome (Wang, 1997; Herschler, 1995). Nevertheless,
most of these studies were completed within the first few years of the
reform effort. After entering the new millennium, the scholarly
attention paid to China's 1994 fiscal reforms gradually diminished.
Given the significant impact of 1994 reforms to the current fiscal
system in China, and its vital historical link between the past and the
future, the author believes that assessing the reform in an
intermediate phase is warranted. This study revisits the issue of
China's 1994 fiscal reform. The next section examines the factors
triggering the 1994 fiscal reforms; Section Ill reveals the contents of
the reforms; Section IV shows the accomplishment of the 1994 fiscal
reform; and Section V explores the unfinished tasks and the last
section proposes some policy recommendations. By and large, the
author expects to have different findings compared with previous
studies, and these findings should have important policy implications.
FACTORS TRIGGERING THE 1994 FISCAL REFORMS

While many factors co-existed in driving the 1994 fiscal reforms,
the primary reason was the decreasing central fiscal capacity
demonstrated in two ratios from 1985 to 1992: (1) total government
revenue over GOP (TR/GOP); and (2) central government revenue over
total government revenue (CR/TR) (see Figure 1).
If we use the comparable prices of GOP from Table 1, which
deducted the influence of inflation, we can calculate the average
annual GOP growth rate In the fifteen-year period between 1978 and
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FIGURE 1
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1993 to be 9.66%. Likewise, we can also calculate the average
annual growth rate of government revenue in the fifteen-year period
from 1978 to 1993 to be 3.20%. In this fifteen-year period, while real
GOP increased 3.99 times, the real government revenue increased
only 1.60 times (both numbers accounted for inflation). These
numbers are revealing. They inform us that while the GOP growth in
this period is astonishing, comparable to the growth records of the
East Asian economies, the fiscal capacity of the Chinese government
was behind the full potential of the GOP increase.
The unfortunate result of the decline of the government's
extractive capacity is also vividly demonstrated in Table 1, which
exhibits government revenue as a percentage of GOP, as well as the
ratios of central and local government revenue to total revenue. From
Table 1, we see a straight linear declining trend of government
revenue as a percentage of GOP (%), the share of government
revenue from close to one third (31.2%) in 1978 all the way down to
about one eighth (12.6%) in 1993. Another disquieting trend is the
share of central government revenue over the total government
revenue, which declines from 40.5% in 1984 to 22.0% in 1993.
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TABLE1

Government Revenue as a Percentage of GOP, and the Ratios of
Central and Local Government Revenue to Total Revenue:
1978-2002
GOP
At
Current
Year
Prices
1978
362.41
1979
403.82
451.78
1980
1981
486.24
1982
529.47
1983
593.45
1984
717.10
896.44
1985
1020.22
1986
1987
1196.25
1988
1492.83
1690.92
1989
1990
1854.79
2161.78
1991
1992
2663.81
1993 3463.44
1994
4675.94
1995
5847.81
1996 6788.46
1997
7446.26
7834.52
1998
1999 8206.75
2000 8940.36
2001
9593.33
2002* 10239.8
2003* 11669.4
*

Notes:

At
Current
Prices
113.23
114.64
115.99
117.58
121.23
136.70
164.29
200.48
212.20
219.94
235.72
266.49
293.71
314.95
348.34
434.90
5218.10
624.22
740.80
8651.14
987.60
1144.41
1339.52
1638.60
1891.4
2169.1

As%
of
GOP
31.2
28.4
25.7
24.2
22.9
23.0
22.9
22.4
20.8
18.4
15.8
15.8
15.8
14.6
13.1
12.6
11.2
10.7
10.9
11.6
12.6
13.9
15.0
17.1
18.5
18.6

Government Revenues
Central Government Local Government
%of
%of
Yuans
Total
Yuans
Total
(Billions) Revenue (billions) Revenue
84.5
15.5
79.8
20.2
75.5
24.5
73.5
26.5
71.4
28.6
35.8
64.2
59.5
40.5
61.6
38.4
63.3
36.7
66.5
33.5
67.1
32.9
30.9
69.1
66.2
33.8
70.2
29.8
28.1
71.9
95.75
22.0 339.14
78.0
290.65
55.7 231.16
44.3
325.66
47.8
52.2 298.56
366.11
49.4 374.69
50.6
422.69
48.9 442.42
51.1
489.20
49.5 498.40
50.5
584.92
51.1 559.49
48.9
698.92
52.2 640.61
47.8
858.27
59.6 780.33
40.4
1102.0
58.3
789.4
41.7
1246.5
57.5
922.6
42.5

* Xiang, 2003; ** Jin, 2004.

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical
Yearbook 2001. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2001 and 2002.
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These figures not only reveal a shrinking share of total
government revenue as a percentage of GOP, but also indicate a
declining percentage of central government revenue over total
revenue. The decline of these two ratios is by no means trivial.
Compared to other nations, the ratio of China's government revenue
over GOP is fairly low. In the United States, tax revenue absorbs over
30 percent of GOP, while the government share of GOP in most
developed countries is even higher [e.g., shares in 1992: USA: 32.2;
Japan: 34.4; UK: 38.8; Canada: 43.1; Western Germany: 45.3; France:
46.1; Sweden: 60.0. Source: OECD, Statistics for Member Countries
(June-July 1994)]. The average ratios between central and local
revenue receipts in the 1980s were-US is 2.5:1, India 2.8:1, England
5:1, and in China the ratio was 0.43:1 (Herschler, 1995).
To be sure, there is a sound rationale for government to be
involved in the activities of economic development and to take a fair
share of GOP. In modern society, government is accountable for a
number of functions. According to Musgrave and Musgrave (1989),
modern governments' major functions include allocation, distribution
and stabilization. To realize these functions for the benefit of the
whole society, fiscal instruments are inevitably crucial. The low share
of Chinese government revenue not only worries Chinese policy
makers, but also has become a big concern of scholars throughout
the globe (Lin, 2000). Bahl and Wallich (1992) concluded that public
service levels are not adequate in all parts of China and the
infrastructure gap might become a key problem in the future. Stiglitz
(1998) believed that the Chinese government revenue share over
GOP is too small compared with other nations and is a big barrier in
China's accomplishment in its blueprint of economic development.
Wang (1997) regarded the massive decline of the government's
extractive capacity as an enfeeblement of China's ability to exercise
macro control to an alarming extent. With the declining share of
government revenue over GOP, especially the declining ratio of central
government revenue over total revenue, many Chinese scholars
worried about the growing regional disparity as well as the general low
level of public service providing capacity (XIn, 1998; Xu, 1998; Yang &
Wei, 1996).
Then, what are the underlying contributors to the decline in
government budgetary revenue in China? Lin (2000) identified three
primary reasons (lowered corporate tax rates, small tax base, and tax
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evasions) that lead to the shrinking share of government revenue over
GOP. Wang {1997) argued it was imperative to plug in the five major
loopholes {tax evasion, tax reductions and exemptions, tax arrears,
extra-budgetary funds and extra-extra-budgetary funds) in order to
arrest the two ratios from further decline. While their arguments are
meaningful and are accountable for at least part of the underlying
causes, the fundamental problem should be examined at a deeper
level. My argument is along the line of reform designers, who regard
the institutional arrangement of China's previous fiscal system as the
root of flaw that resulted in the decline of the two ratios. With this in
mind, we now briefly examine the fiscal relationship between the
center and locality before the 1994 reform.

As we know, China's economy was a centrally controlled planed
system in the Mao era {1949-1976). At that time governments at
various levels not only owned the corresponding enterprises, but also
.were involved in enterprise management from plan, production,
purchase and sale, as well as In fixing prices of materials and final
products. The relationship between central and local governments is
much like a pendulum swinging between trends in centralization and
decentralization, reflecting the domestic management needs of
political control at the top versus regional economic development at
the bottom locality {Straussman & Zhang, 2001). The fiscal division of
power fluctuated along the different periods of PRC's history and
became an enduring topic of research and real politics. The
centralized fiscal system featured in Mao's era was inconsistent with
the market-oriented reforms beginning in 1978. At least three factors
caused the changes in China's fiscal system. The first Is the rapid
growth of non-state-owned enterprises: township and village
enterprises, joint ventures, and private businesses. Second,
accompanied by the growth of local political power, it is natural for
local governments to require a commensurate decision-making power
in the fiscal aspect. Third, only a decentralized fiscal system could
stimulate local government in collecting revenue and promoting
economic growth {Lin & Liu, 2000). The overall economic reform
embarked on in the late 1970s was oriented toward the benefit of
lower sub-national governments by means of "playing to the
provinces" {Shirk, 1993). In the process, the center has lost, at least
partially, its capacity to control the government below it {Wang, 1994).
The central-local balance of power has undergone an unprecedented
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and irreversible tilt toward the province, and even to the levels
beneath the provinces (Zhang, 2002).
At least four types/phases of fiscal arrangement can be
distinguished from 1979 to 1993 (Lin, 2000). They are: Allow State
Enterprises to Keep Some Profits (fang quan rang li); Substitute Taxes
for Profit (li gai shui); the Contract Responsibility System (bao gan zhi)
and the Tax Plus Profit system (li shui fen liu). A consequence of
these fiscal reform efforts was the decline of "two ratios." How did
this happen? An open secret is the conspiracy between local
governments and enterprises at the expense of the central coffer.
Before 1994, revenue and/or tax were collected by the local
governments first and then submitted to the central government.
Afterwards, the central government returned a share (according to a
formula agreed upon by both sides) to the local governments. Most
local governments frequently failed to realize its full potential in
collecting all the possible money and then submitting the revenue to
the center. Rather, they play games with the central government. The
local governments would rather collect much less money from
enterprises in each jurisdiction and ask these enterprises to
contribute (in various format) part of the money to the local
governments' extra-budgetary accounts or let these enterprises
"voluntarily" provide local public services, which are the responsibility
of the local governments, such as paving roads or building bridges or
tunnels. Local governments often offer incentives to allure new
enterprises in each territory by granting tax exemptions and
deductions. These maneuvers and tricks have benefited both the
local governments and the enterprises, but have caused a heavy loss
for the central treasury.
The above theory of conspiracy between local governments and
enterprises had found a widespread market before the 1994 fiscal
reforms. Although the practice was pervasive, empirical evidence was

hard to collect. Fortunately, the 1994 fiscal reforms provided a golden
opportunity to test the "Conspiracy Theory." A case in point was the
revenue base. To ensure that every province would agree to and
implement the 1994 fiscal reform policies, the interests of provinces
could not be jeopardized. At least the previous provincial fiscal
revenue level should be guaranteed. Initially, 1992 had been selected
as the base year by the standing Committee of the Politburo. However,
due to high pressure from coastal provinces, especially Guangdong,
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the center decided to use 1993 instead as the base year. When local
governments realized this in late September of 1993, there was a
collection fever over the country. For the remaining three months in
1993, local fiscal performance rocketed. "Some local governments
collected arrears of taxes, some urged local banks to make loans to
enterprises so that they would be able to pay such arrears, and some
even collected 1994 taxes in advance" (Wang, 1997: 811}. 1993
local tax collection was 28.3% higher than the budgeted number and
39.9% higher than 1992 (Wang, 1997}. This story suggests that local
governments do have the capacity to collect more taxes but lacked
the interest to do so in previous years. How to harness and constrain
the fiscal power of locality to benefit both the central and local coffers
became the central concern of new institutional design in the
upcoming fiscal reform.
MAJOR CONTENTS OF THE 1994 FISCAL REFORM

What is China's 1994 fiscal reform? In short, this is an umbrella
term accommodating a wide range of files and contents. To different
observers and commentators, the 1994 reform may have various
connotations. The reform efforts were widely called "fiscal reform,"
"tax reform," "tax-assignment reform or "tax-sharing reform." This
confusion may derive from a number of reform regulations enacted by
the end of 1993 which relate to fiscal and tax systems. Accord to Jia
(2000}, within the first one hundred days of 1994, there were about
80 documents issued by fiscal or tax authorities as well as the State
Council. Each added complementary regulations or adjustments to
solve the imminent and prominent problems of tax related policy
concerns. The chief official document, we believe, Is Decisions on
Implementing Tax-sharing Fiscal Management System, issued by the
State Council (1993}. The file was issued on December 15 of 1993,
to be carried out immediately from the first day of 1994. In short, the
1994 fiscal reform contains the following major contents.
Tax Division
Unlike the pre-1994 fiscal system where-the revenue amount
was usually negotiated between the center and each province on a
one-by-one basis, the new design unified the tax division and formed
three parts: central tax, local tax and shared tax (see Table 2}. By
doing so, tax obligation was expected to be transparent, with a greatly
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reduced or eliminated transaction cost, and horizon equality realized
among the provinces or province-level units.
TABLE2

Tax Shares of 1994 Tax Reform
Central Taxes - Tariffs
- Consumption tax and Value-added tax collected by
customs
- Consumption tax
- Income tax of central enterprises
- Income tax from financial enterprises which have
obtained business license from the People's bank of
China
- Tax on revenues turned in by railways, banks and
insurance companies ·
- Offshore oil resource taxes
Local Taxes
- Business tax (exclude that turned in by banks, railways
and insurance companies)
- Income tax from local enterprises
- Personal income tax
- Urban land use tax
- Adjustment tax on fixed asset investment direction
- Urban maintain and construction tax (exclude that turned
in by banks, railways and insurance companies)
- Real Estate duty
- Tax on vehicle and boat license
- Stamp duty
- Laughter tax
- Agricultural and husbandry tax
- Agricultural tax levied on special products
- Occupation tax on cultivated land
- Contract tax
- Inheritance and gifts tax
- Land appreciation tax
- Income tax on rented state land
Shared Taxes - Value-added tax: central government (75%) and local
government (25%)
- Stock transactions gains tax: central government (50%)
and local government (50%)
- Resource tax other than offshore oil resource tax: mostly
to local government

Sources: The State Council (1993).
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Ascal Administration
Pre-1994, there was no branch of State Tax Service (STS) at subnational governments thus the central treasury relied on local fiscal
departments to collect and submit revenues first, and then a portion
was returned to the locality. As we have shown in section 2, local
governments usually utilized this mechanism to play games with the
center to the benefit of the locality. The 1994 fiscal reform
established central government's own branch tax bureaus within local
governments, creating two parallel line tax systems: a national system
for central taxes and a local system for local taxes. Shared taxes were
collected by the local branches of STS first, and then the proceeds
were split between the center and sub-national governments
according to the agreed upon formula. The downward-sharing
mechanism is essential in preventing the previous local abuses. As
we will see later, the sharing direction is by no means insignificant.

Tax Rates Standardized and Tax Types Simplified
Before 1994, the tax rates and types were very complicated. First,
different enterprise ownerships [state, collective, private enterprises,
township and village enterprises (TVE), foreign-invested enterprises
(FIEs), foreign enterprises (FEs)] enjoyed different tax rates. Special
Economic Zones (SEZ) and some coastal cities had preferential tax
policies. Many local governments also enacted a number of
preferential tax policies to attract investment for local economic
development. Additionally, different industries might have different
available tax treatment. The 1994 fiscal reform unified the enterprise
Income tax rates to be 33%, regardless of state, collective, TVE, or
private ownerships. For joint ventures, the initial plan was that the
unification income tax rates would be implemented for a longer term,
when the current agreement of preferential tax policies phased out.
However, the Asian financial crisis had postponed the implementation
of such a plan (Lin, 2001). For tax types, the old 32 tax types (except
tariff and agricultural taxes) would be reduced to 18 (Xu & Zhang,
2001). One of the motivations behind the segregated tax rates was to
curb the growth of private enterprises and to meet the government's
special economic policies (Lin, 2001). The logic of 1994 fiscal reform
is obvious-the tax burden among different types of enterprises should
be equal. With the anticipated entry of WTO, the joint ventures also
should stand on the same footing as the domestic enterprises.
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Tax Exemptions and Deductions
Pre-1994, local governments frequently used tax exemptions and
deductions to attract new investment and also to conspire with
enterprises by granting tax breaks. The net effect was the weakened
central coffer and decreased local budgetary revenues. As explained
in Section II, the central government is the loser in this game of
conspiracy, while the local government is the winner with more money
to use at its own discretion. From the perspective of the central
government, there is an efficiency loss of taxable revenue. From the
view of the society in general, the consequence of conspiracy
behavior is more extra-budgetary fund and even extra-extra-budgetary
fund collected by the local governments, leading to redundant
industry and economic construction and increased cases of
corruption (Holzer & Zhang, 2004). The 1994 fiscal reform provided
tax exemption and a reduction of authority back to the central
government, explicitly regulating that no further tax holidays or breaks
can be granted by any local governments. But for the consistency of
policy implementation and the credibility of local governments, the
previously contracted tax exemptions and deductions would be
implemented until the end of 1995.
The aforementioned four aspects are only part of the important
1994 fiscal reform design. The 1994 fiscal reform was not a minor
effort in tinkering with the old fiscal system, but rather a
comprehensive overhaul for shuffling the entirety of the institutional
arrangement between the center and the locality associated with a
division of tax jurisdiction and authority. The 1994 fiscal reform also
targeted an equal tax-burden effort for different business ownership
or types. Facing a dilemma of increasing pressure of rising demand
for the thirsting expenditure of providing public service, while seeing a
shrinking piece of pie in central revenue year by year, the central
government made a grand resolution to fight back. A clear goal of
China's 1994 fiscal reform was to make the government revenue
cake bigger, with a larger share going to the central government (The
State Council, 1993). The next section examines whether such
expectations can be accomplished.
THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE 1994 FISCAL REFORM

Almost ten years have passed since the introduction of China's
1994 fiscal reform and it appears to be an appropriate time now to
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assess the intermediate effect of the institutional design of the
reforms.
An unavoidable grand question to ask is whether the fiscal reform
has brought about the effects the reformers expected. To be more
specific, whether the government revenue has increased as a
percentage of GOP {the first ratio) and whether the central
government revenue increased over the total government revenue
(the second ratio)?
To answer these two specific questions, we need to examine table
1 carefully. In the period from 1993 to 1998, the first ratio
(government revenue over GOP) decreased in the first two years (from
12.6% in 1993 to 10.7% in 1995) and then slightly increased in the
next three years (from 10.7% in 1995 to 12.6 in 1998). These
unimpressive records probably serve as the basis for many early
unsatisfactory observers and commentators who concluded that the
1994 fiscal reform is not a success, or at least not a big one
{Herschler, 1995; Lin, 2000; Wang, 1997). For the second ratio,
central government revenue over government revenue, the effect was
immediately shown. The ratio of central government revenue over
government revenue jumped forward from 22.0% in 1993 to 55.7% in
1994, and then declined to 49.5% in 1998. The leap of the second
ratio is more like a two-sided coin depending upon the interpretation,
rather than the absolute truth. On the optimistic side, the increased
ratio was close to the expectation number (60%) that reform
designers had desired; on the pessimistic side, the increased share
of the central government revenue was no more than nominal, as will
be discussed later.
Nevertheless, the policy designers of the1994 fiscal reform were
not short-sighted. Their focus aimed at a long-term institutional
rational-approach. As the Vice-Director of the State Tax Bureau noted
in 1995, "The policy changes of the central government follow the
principle of incremental philosophy. What concerns the central
government is the reform of institutional mechanism, not the gain or
loss in the short run" (Xu & Zhang, 2001). Its effect would emerge in
a longer scope. The share of the total government revenue over GOP
increased from 12.6% in 1993 to 18.5% in 2002. While the average
GOP growth rate was 8.96% {excluding the influence of inflation) from
1993 to 2001, the average growth rate of total government revenue,
excluding the influence of inflation, was 13.2% in the same period,
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which surpasses the GOP growth rate an average of 4.24 % each year.
Using 1993 as the base year, the average growth rate of central
revenue was 26.2% from 1993 to 2001, while the growth rate of
average local revenue was 6.46%. The change from 1993 to 1994
may have been too sudden to be indicative. Thus a better reference
point was to use 1994 as base year. By doing so, the growth rate of
central revenue was 14.23% from 1994 to 2001, while the local
revenue growth rate was 16.44% in the same period.2 These numbers
are meaningful and indicative. First, average total government
revenue growth rate far surpassed average growth rate of GOP from
1993 to 2001, suggesting a consistent behavior of great efforts in
collecting tax revenues by the government. Second, using 1994 as
the base year, we found an amazing average growth rate of both
central government revenue (14.23%) and local government revenue
(16.44%) from 1994 to 2001, suggesting that tax collectors at both
central and local levels worked hard to achieve the policy goals. These
two groups of numbers (the average GOP growth rate and the average
growth rate of total government revenue) are reminiscent of the
counterparts from 1978 to 1993, whenever the GOP growth rate was
9.66% while the growth rate of total government revenue was only

3.2%.
Although many converging factors were at work in driving the first
ratio (the government revenue over GOP) up from 12.6% in 1993 to
18.5% in 2002, we have to acknowledge that the primary source of
this success was the institutional design of the 1994 fiscal reforms.
The high growth rates of both central government revenue and local
government revenue from 1994 to 2001 reveal that incentives of
both the center and the locality were consistently boosted. The
central government's share as a percentage of total revenue from
22.0% in 1993 Increased to 59.6% in 2001, suggesting a promising
prospect in approaching the original policy objectives (60% for the
second ratio). Although some may argue that the Increase of the
central governmental revenue is only nominal, not much revenue
would be left after deducing of the center's refund to provinces and
fiscal transfer to poor provinces (Lee, 2000; Wang, 1997), It is at
least politically significant even if it is nominal. Before 1994, the
central government had to rely on local government to submit
revenue. Now local governments must rely on central government to
return revenue or fiscal transfer. This change from bottom-up to topdown suggests a leader-follower game which Is beneficial In
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strengthening the macro coordination and control capacity of the
central government (Hu, 1996; Xu & Zhang, 2001).
The chief accomplishment of the 1994 fiscal reforms was the
consistent and rapid growth of government revenue. However, this
achievement should not overshadow the reform results in other
aspects. As an institutional overhaul of 1994 fiscal reforms, the real
effect surpassed the expectations of some reform designers (Xu &
Zhang, 2001). In addition to the government revenue surge, the
performance of 1994 fiscal reform was mainly manifested in the
adjustment of the following three pairs of relationship. They are:
government-enterprise, central-local governments and State-citizen.
The traditional relationship before 1994 between government and
enterprises was more featured by administrative instruments than by
economic means. Governments at different levels frequently
negotiated with enterprises for the profits to be submitted. The
contract responsibility system was a product of such a mechanism.
But even after quota was mutually agreed, government often changed
the rules of the game in its favor. This situation also caused the
conspiracy of local governments with enterprise at a loss to the
central treasury. Uncertainty, unpredictability and arbitrariness were
the characteristics of the old system. Since 1994, the governmententerprise relationship has been much more rule-based. Enterprises,
irrespective of their size, types and ownership, pay taxes to the
governments according to the corresponding tax law, rules and
regulations. Tax burdens were unified at 33% income tax rate for
every enterprise. Tax types were simplified from the previous 32 types
to the current 18. Now, the norm is certainty and predictability for the
relationship between government and enterprise.
For the relationship between central and local governments, the
1994 fiscal reform had greatly enhanced the transparency and
normality of fiscal allocation. In the previous years since 1978,
central-local fiscal relation was subjected to frequent negotiation, In
which mechanism lacks either transparency or equity among the peer
provinces. As evidence shows, the center had been willing and
capable to regulate the provincial fiscal autonomy according to
central preference (Chung, 1995). The 1994 fiscal reforms tried to
rationalize the division of fiscal authority between center and locality,
making the relationship more rule-based.
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As for the relationship between the State and citizen, the focus
was also on the rule of law. The amended Act of Personal Income Tax
of PRC was promulgated in October 31 of 1993, to be effective on
January 1, 1994. For wages and salary, there are nine grades of
progressive tax rates from 5% to 45%. For individual owned business,
the income tax follows five grades of progressive tax rates from 5% to
35% (Jia, 2000). Some of the previous illegitimate regulations were
abolished (Xu & Zhang, 2001). The outcome of adjusting the
relationship between the State and citizen was not so illuminative,
and the impact had to wait an even longer term.
There are other accomplishments such as the containment of the
rocketing inflation rates from late 1992 and the reduction of tax
burden for enterprises demonstrated from empirical study (Xu &
Zhang, 2001). The 1994 fiscal reform, as with any other reform
crusade, was not perfect. With this point in mind, we now turn to the
unfinished business.
REMAINING PROBLEMS OF CHINESE FISCAL REFORMS

The 1994 fiscal reform was a big remedial operation targeted to
the problems of the old system. An action of such large scale cannot
be expected to be perfect. It is nevertheless an ongoing process to
complement the institutional design and to solve the newly emerging
problems. "Trial and error" and "touching the stone to cross the river"
that had guided Chinese reforms since 1978 were also in some sense
applicable to the field of Chinese fiscal reform. Yet, pragmatic
pressure and theoretical concerns had raised many questions that
were not well addressed by the 1994 reform design or
implementation. The following is only a simplified sketch of the
problems to be dealt with by the policy makers and administrators.
First, although the central government's share as a percentage of
total revenue increased from 22.0% in 1993 to 59.6% in 2001, there
were widespread concerns that the central government's disposable
revenue was too low (Lee, 2000; Wang, 1997). Indeed, as discussed
above, this is a "two-edged sword" depending upon how we view and
interpret the issue. If the central revenue is defined as central
collection plus local remittance and then minus central refunds and
subsidies to the provinces, the percentage of central government's
revenue was fairly low (26.0% in 1994, 30.2% in 1995, 20.9% in
1996 and 22.0% in 1997) (Wang, 1997). According to the data from
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Lee (2000), there was also a slight decline of net central government
revenue over national fiscal revenue from 1992 to 1998 (Table 3).
Second, the division of fiscal authority between the center and the
locality should be first conducted on the analysis of expenditure need
at each level of government. However, the 1994 fiscal reform, similar
to previous efforts, focused on the side of revenue first, leaving the
question of "who should be responsible for what" blurred. This
ambiguity created the problem of ad hoc directives from the center to
require local expenditure. These un-funded mandates frequently
turned out to be an extra burden to the locality, a phenomenon
popularly called "center hosted banquet but paid from local pocket."
Third, the 1994 reforms had kept too many vestiges of the old
system, such as the four concessions of the center to the locality.
These vestiges served well to smooth the transition from the old
system to the new one, but also complicated the Implementation of
the reform design and therefore postponed the effect.
Fourth, a rational approach of reform should clearly demarcate
the boundary of fiscal authority between the center and the locality.
TABLE3

Net Central Government Revenue over National Fiscal Revenue
(In billion RMB Yuans)
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Central Fiscal Revenue after Intergovernmental Transfers
National
Net
Net /National
141.16
423.00
33.37%
148.81
513.22
28.99%
161.64
605.55
26.69%
194.42
711.98
27.31%
244.16
857.28
28.48%
262.48
957.46
27.41%
267.85
1,064.57
25.16%

Notes: Net Central Fiscal Revenue • Central Fiscal Revenue - Transfers from
center to localities + Transfers from Localities to center. To follow the
definition of fiscal revenue in the International Monetary Fund's
Government Finance Statistics, China's fiscal revenues are adjusted by
including all the negative revenues such as subsidies to loss-making
state-owned enterprises and export rebates.
Sources: Lee (2000).
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Unfortunately, the 1994 reforms did not prohibit the center's arbitrary
behavior. Given the long time earned reputation of not abiding by the
rules by the center (Chung, 1995; Herschler, 1995}, there was no
reason for the sub-national government not to act opportunistically.
For example, Wuhan City Tax Bureau circulated an "internal
document" with 120 provisions that authorized tax exemptions or
deductions for local enterprises, suggesting that some local
governments continued to play games with the center (Herschler,
1995}.
Fifth, the central government claimed virtually all the tax authority
in the 1994 fiscal reform. In addition to the tax exemption and
deduction rights no longer available to the locality, sub-national
governments still have no rights in deciding tax rate, determining tax
base or levying new taxes. The formally enfeebled local government
thus has to continue to seek the informal ways for increasing revenue,
instruments such as collecting extra-budgetary fund and extra-extrabudgetary fund are sometimes illegitimate, but often a possible
choice for the local governments.
Sixth, inter-government transfer is not rational or typical according
to the international practice. Current government transfer in China
includes two parts. The first is the refund to each province to ensure
the revenue of the previous year is guaranteed. The second part is
the fiscal transfer from the center to poor provinces (or province level
units} to reduce the gap between rich and poor provinces. Critics
believe that the refund enlarged rather than decreased the gap
between rich and poor provinces, and the second part fiscal transfer
Jacks a clear formula for deciding "who gets what."
Seventh, since the tax-sharing system between the center and the
provinces is far from complete, the tax-sharing system between local
governments (government levels lower than the province level} and
provinces leaves much to be desired (Yan, 2001; Yu, 1998; Zhang,
2000}.
Eighth, the fiscal reforms of 1994 did not have particular
measures to address the Issues of extra-budgetary funds (EBFs} and
extra-extra-budgetary funds (EEBFs} that had long plagued the central
government. Simply stated, EBFs were income collected and
expended by government agencies and quasi-governments (such as
service institutions}. Although these funds are on the budgeted books,
they are beyond the reach of fiscal departments of either central or
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local governments. For the EEBFs which came from ad hoc charges,
unauthorized fees, involuntary "contributions" and so forth, they are
even not reported to fiscal departments at every level of government
(Holzer & Zhang, 2004).
Ninth, it is necessary to coordinate the tax behavior by the local
branches of State Tax Bureau (STB) and local tax bureaus. Some
enterprises face the problem of multi-head tax management since
both the local branches of STB and local tax bureaus are collecting
their tax, while in some other domains, "who is in charge of what" is
not quite clear (Xu, 1998). As for the tax administrators in the local
branches of STB, they have to be loyal to both their bosses at a higher
level of STB offices and the local government officials. This double
allegiance does not always work together and sometimes presents
problems and conflicts.
Tenth, the income tax of SOEs is collected by the separate division
of affiliation of central and local governments respectively. The
concept of what enterprises belong to what level of governments is a
barrier to the establishment of a real modern enterprise system (Xu,
1998). The different affiliations of enterprises also encourage the
local protectionism and create a number of problems.
Eleventh, there are wide gaps between different regions and with
the tax policies applied to the domestic and international enterprises.
This is not conducive to fair competition of enterprise and regions.
When the fiscal reform system was introduced in 1994, the
government authorized tax refunds to foreign invested enterprises
(FIEs) and foreign enterprises (FEs) established before 1994 and
located in special economic zones (SEZs). This preferential policy was
initially granted for a five-year period, yet later extended to 10 years in
some zones. Preferential tax policies expired for 10 of China's 44
SEZs by the end of 1999 and were not renewed. The rest of the SEZs
would phase out their preferential treatment by the end of 2003 so
that an "even playing field" would be established ("Goodbye to SEZ,"
1998).
Twelfth, the significance of the implementation of the rule of law
in the area of tax collection cannot be overstated. In the period after
the 1994's fiscal reforms, tax evasion, tax arrears and tax cheating
were still serious. How to rigorously implement the rule of law not only
attracted scholars (Herschler, 1995; Hu, 1996; Jla, 1999; 2000;
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Wang, 1997), but was also emphasized by China's financial minister
in recent years (Jin, 2004; Xiang, 2001; 2002; 2003).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPROVING
CHINA'S FISCAL SYSTEM

Overall, the power of China's 1994 fiscal reforms has been
demonstrated over time. The chief accomplishment is the increase in
the government's total revenue over the GOP, making a growing
bigger cake of fiscal revenue. This and other achievements are mainly
attributable to the institutional redesign of China's central-local
relationship, as well as State-enterprise relationship. Viewing the
fiscal reforms of 1994 through a longer lens, this author concludes a
far more positive assessment than most of the previous studies have
shown. The success of the 1994 reforms does not suggest that the
main tasks in the financial arena have been completed. Rather, the
reform process has raised more questions than it has addressed. At
least, twelve aspects of unsolved questions have been identified in
the last section. To solve these questions and others that might
appear at any moment in the transition era of reform, we have to rely
on the rule of law and an alignment to the international standards.
Market orientation, democratic means and rational approach could
offer important clues for most of the reform efforts.
Regarding the question of central revenue share, what amount is
appropriate for the disposable revenue? We need to seek the answer
from two sources. First, what is the international standard for the
share of central government revenue over the total government
revenue? Do other countries have as great of a variance of revenue
share between central and local government according to different
stages of economic development? And what country is a good model
for China to follow, if there is really one? What is the appropriate
division of expenditure between central and local government? Only
when it is decided what functions should be the responsibility of
central government and local government, can we approximately
calculate what reasonable percentage of national revenue should go
for central government's expenditure. Apparently, China Is still far
from locating an optimal point to divide the responsibility between
central and local governments for offering public service, and
between State and society in deciding which part is the domain of the
government. Certain public services urgently needed by the society
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have not been adequately provided by the government, such as
environment protection, while in some other areas such as profit
making business, government still stretches a hand. Marching on the
way toward market economy, China has a lot to learn from matured
systems and its own previously learned lessons.

As an authoritarian state, the 1994 reform did not constrain the
power of central government, which endangers the efforts in
mobilizing local enthusiasm: especially encouraging local
governments to take advantage of any policy loopholes. With the
frequent reversal of central policies penalizing those who did not take
advantage of the center's moves, the lack of a constitutionallyguaranteed framework in marking the power line between center and
locality presents a big problem of the local's confidence in the center
(Jia & Lin, 1994). A case in point is the issue of taxing legislative
power by the local authority. The 1994 fiscal reforms almost do not
touch the issue, but simply take the tax exemption and reduction
power away from the hands of local government officials. The subnational governments have so far been Jacking the power to decide a
tax base, tax rates and to levy new taxes. China is a huge country with
a territory bigger than that of the USA and a population accounting for
one fifth of the world population. The lack of tax legislative authority
provides a power disadvantage to local government in meeting the
demand of local public service. More often than not, the local
governments have to explore other channels for revenue, such as the
EBFs and EEBFs which are sometimes illegitimate. My
recommendation is that China should allow provincial and city level
government legislative power to decide a local tax base, tax rates and
to levy new taxes, though this power should be vested in the local
legislature-People's Congress at provincial and city levels.
For EBFs and EEBFs, most of them should be converted to the
budgetary fund in the management of each level of financial
department. The government should have strict laws, rules and
regulations to complete the transition within a given period. In doing
so, the government revenue can be further boosted and the problems
of EBFs and EEBFs eliminated, but a prEH:ondition is to grant local
legislatures the power to enact local tax rules.
Additionally, law enforcement should be strengthened. Otherwise
these unimplemented cases become demonstrable samples for
others to follow, further weakening the fiscal capacity of government.
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In the past, tax evasion, tax arrears and tax cheating frequently came
into the lexicon of fiscal management. This situation should be
reversed to collect the revenue that the society so urgently needs.
In 2002, total tax revenue was 1, 700.4 billion RBM yuan, in
China,1 the biggest contributor being State-Owned Enterprise (536.17
billion yuans, about 32.2% of the total). Other contributors to the
revenue were: Stock-5hare Companies (435.52 billion yuans), Joint
Venture and Foreign Enterprises (348. 71 billion yuans}, Individual
Businesses (100.49 billion yuans), Private Enterprises (94.56 billion
yuans) and Collective Enterprises (92.94 billion yuans}. Among these
contributors, the share of State-Owned Enterprises had decreased
from 55.2% in 1998 to 32.2% in 2002. The average revenue growth
rate for the Stock-5hare Enterprises was 59.5% from 1998 to 2002
(http://chanye.finance.sina.com.cn;cs/2003-05-14/165365.shtml,
access on April 24, 2004). These numbers indicate a changing
structure of China's enterprises and the sources of the government
revenue.
In summary, 1994 fiscal reform in China was only a part of the
reform efforts initiated since 1978. Under a broader backdrop of
China's transition from traditional planned economy to socialist
market economy and from rule by man to rule of law, a lot of changes
have been occurring in virtually every corner of the Chinese society. In
the process, administrative reforms have consistently adjusted and
reoriented the governmental functions and the roles government
played in the society. Enterprise reform has witnessed the
restructuring of enterprise composition, leading to the rapid growth of
non-state owned businesses. Political reform has brought about the
changes that resulted in a more democratic way of organizational life.
For the relationship between state and citizen, the current reforms
represent a paradigm shift from the old state-centered governance
toward new citizen-centered governance which would benefit all
sectors of Chinese society (Zhang and Zhang, 2001). In this
perspective, the fiscal reform is not an isolated arena. Rather, fi.scal
reforms are driving engines for the change of the other parts of the
society, and in the meantime, it is shaped by the Ideology of
contemporary society. As the current catchwords indicate, the fiscal
reforms have to "keep pace with time."
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NOTES

1. This perspective is obtained from an interview with local public
finance officials from Hubei province.
2. The growth rate of GOP or government revenues were calculated
by the author, all growth rates deducted the influence of inflation.
3. The number of government revenue cited here was different from
the revenue reported by Huaicheng Xuang, the Minister of
Finance Department
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COMMENTS ON "ASSESSING CHINA'S 1994 FISCAL REFORMS: AN
INTERMEDIATE REPORT"
Melli Niu and John R. Bartle*

As a milestone change in intergovernmental fiscal relations,
China·s 1994 fiscal reform had far-reaching effects on China's fiscal
administration. Assessing China's 1994 fiscal reform is therefore a
daunting assignment. Most research deals with specific aspects of
the reform and lacks a deep exploration of reasons for and Influences
of the reform. This article is welcome because it fills that gap.
The article begins by demonstrating that the 1994 fiscal reform
was the result of converging forces beyond the superficial effort to
improve the central government's fiscal capacity. This study argues
that the strain of the centralized planned economic system was the
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underlying cause. The article then examines major provisions of the
1994 fiscal reform. The 1994 fiscal reform Is also called "tax-sharing
reform" or "tax-assignment reform" because most provisions of the
new system are related to the division of tax sources and tax
administration authority between the central government and local
governments. Four topics are discussed in turn: tax assignment; fiscal
administration; tax rates standardization and tax simplification; and
tax exemptions and deductions. While there is no easy way to
evaluate the effects of the 1994 fiscal reform, this article
demonstrates three accomplishments of the reform. First, it led to an
increase in total government revenue as a share of the economy and
an increase in the central government's share of total government
revenue. Second, it improved the relationships between governments
and enterprises, the central government and local governments, and
the state and the citizen. Third, and most importantly, it furthered the
movement toward a more rule-based system. However, the author
argues that the 1994 fiscal reform left old problems and created new
ones. Twelve problems are discussed which suggest an agenda for
future fiscal reforms.
The important contributions of the article are evident in three
aspects. First, it presents a deeper understanding of the impact of
the tax assignment reforms. Increasing the central government's
fiscal capacity was not the most lasting change in the long run; more
important was the move towards a rule-based fiscal administration
system to accommodate the transition from a planned economy to a
market economy. Second, the presentation of twelve remaining
problems demonstrates the need for an intermediate assessment on
the 1994 fiscal reform and provides policy-makers the direction for
future reforms. Third, the author demonstrates that fiscal reform is
closely related to other issues, in particular political reform that is
shaping the evolution of democratic governance in China.
Although the author argues that the 1994 fiscal reform leaves
"who should be responsible for what" unsolved, it does not articulate
an alternative approach to the issue. Perhaps this question is not one
that should be answered directly, but rather should emerge from the
interaction of governments, enterprises and citizens. "Who should be
responsible for what" is the critical question that all societies have to
answer, and most do so by iterating to a pragmatic balance of
institutional arrangements rather than applying a textbook solution.
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This article is important reading for scholars of fiscal
administration and of Chinese society, as well as for Chinese policymakers. The timeless nature of the questions it asks also makes it of
interest to all scholars of government administration.

* Melli Nlu, Ph.D., and John R. Bartle, Ph.D., are an assistant professor and
an associate professor, respectively, School of Public Administration,
University of Nebraska at Omaha.
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